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The field of Industrial Organization has made dramatic advances over the last few decades in developing
empirical methods for analyzing imperfect competition and the organization of markets. We describe
the motivation for these developments and some of the successes. We also discuss the relative emphasis
that applied work in the field has placed on economic theory relative to statistical research design,
and the possibility that a focus on methodological innovation has crowded out applications. We offer
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Introduction 
 
The field of industrial organization has made dramatic advances over the last few decades 
in developing empirical methods for analyzing imperfect competition and the 
organization of markets. These new methods have diffused widely: into merger reviews 
and antitrust litigation, regulatory decision-making, price-setting by retailers, the design 
of auctions and marketplaces, and into neighboring fields in economics, marketing and 
engineering. Increasing access to firm-level data and in some cases the ability to 
cooperate with firms or governments in experimental research designs is offering new 
settings and opportunities to apply these ideas in empirical work. 
 
This essay begins with a sketch of how the field has evolved to its current state, in 
particular how the field’s emphasis has shifted over time from attempts to relate broad 
aggregate measures across industries toward more focused studies of individual 
industries. The second and primary part of the essay describes several active areas of 
inquiry. While in  some sense a survey, our goal is not to be comprehensive but to 
highlight key ideas and illustrate how modern research has approached different 
problems. We also discuss some of the broader impacts of this research and places where 
research efforts have been more or less successful. The last section steps back to offer a 
broader perspective. We address some current debates about research emphasis in the 
field, and more broadly about empirical methods, and offer some thoughts on where 
future research might go. 
 
What Got Us Here? 
 
Industrial organization is concerned with the structure of industries in the economy and 
the behavior of firms and individuals in these industries. The field has historically 
focused on how markets depart from idealized conditions of perfect competition, whether 
because of scale economies, transaction costs, strategic behavior or other factors. From 
an empirical perspective, this leads to questions about how competition plays out in 
different markets, and how it relates to industry structure. Not surprisingly, these   3 
questions overlap with public policy issues, such as the appropriate antitrust stance 
toward concentrated industries or the design of regulatory mechanisms for industries with 
scale economies.  
 
Modern research in industrial organization has evolved largely in response to two 
challenges that plagued the field into the 1970s. The first was a lack of compelling 
theoretical models for studying imperfectly competitive markets. This problem was 
largely reversed by the  game theory revolution of the 1980s, which permitted much 
sharper modeling and analysis of problems such as product differentiation, network 
effects, barriers to entry, pricing strategies, and the effect of asymmetric information in 
product markets (Tirole, 1988). Indeed once this line of research began to advance, 
models proliferated so rapidly that some prominent members of the field were lamenting 




The second challenge for empirical work was a lack of good data  and convincing 
empirical strategies for evaluating hypotheses about competition or industry structure. 
The most active strand of empirical research into the 1980s consisted of cross-industry 
regression analyses that attempted to link market structure across industries with market 
outcomes. This agenda can be traced back at least to Bain (1951, 1956), and is sometimes 
referred to as the “Structure-Conduct-Performance” paradigm. In a typical study, a 
researcher might use data on a cross-section of industries to regress an outcome measure 
such as accounting profit on an industry concentration measure such as the combined 
market share of the four largest firms. Researchers of course recognized that 
concentration might depend on many of the same factors that influenced profitability, 
creating an endogeneity problem. More sophisticated studies might try to “fix” the 
problem by assuming that industry concentration derived from “exogenous” barriers to 
entry, for instance technological scale economies or fixed costs such as advertising or 
research and development.  
                                                 
1 The central issue at the time was that many of these models seemed to be sensitive to hard-to-assess 
assumptions about consumer preferences, asymmetric information, and the ability of firms to make 
strategic commitments. This sensitivity turns out to have had an impact on subsequent empirical research, 
in that it made researchers appreciate the potential importance of even small details in the underlying 
strategic environment.   4 
 
While the broad question of what makes industries more or less competitive is an 
important one, the cross-industry approach had notable limitations. Many studies relied 
on data consisting of a small number of industry aggregates, with empirical measures that 
proxied imperfectly for the relevant economic quantities. For instance, a common 
concern was that accounting measures of profits available in the data might not be an 
accurate gauge of true economic returns. Even more troublesome, most studies in this 
literature lacked convincing strategies for identification. What is needed to identify the 
type of causal effect described above is exogenous variation in industry concentration. 
While cross-industry differences in advertising-to-sales ratios or capital intensity may 
correlate with industry concentration, it is hard to argue that they are unrelated to factors 
affecting firm profits, and hence qualify as useful instrumental variables. This problem 
was well summarized by Schmalensee (1989, p. 954), who began his definitive review of 
the cross-industry literature by acknowledging that “essentially all variables that have 
been employed in such studies are logically endogenous.”   
 
Both the concerns about cross-industry regression models and the development of clearer 
theoretical foundations for analyzing imperfect competition set the stage for a dramatic 
shift in the 1980s toward what Bresnahan (1989) coined the “New Empirical Industrial 
Organization”. Underlying this approach was the idea that individual industries are 
sufficiently distinct, and industry details sufficiently important, that cross-industry 
variation was often going to be problematic as a source of identification. Instead, the new 
wave of research set out to understand the institutional details of particular industries and 
to use this knowledge to test specific hypotheses about consumer or firm behavior, or 
estimate models that could be used for counterfactual analysis, such as what would 
happen following a merger or regulatory change. 
 
The current state of the field reflects this transition. Today, most of the influential 
research in empirical industrial organization looks extensively to economic theory for 
guidance, especially in modeling firm behavior. Studies frequently focus on a single 
industry or market, with careful attention paid to the institutional specifics, measurement   5 
of key variables, and econometric identification issues. Advocates of this approach argue 
that when successful, it combines the conceptual clarity of economic theory with 
convincing empirical measurement, and that the focus on individual industries offers the 
best opportunity to understand the competitive mechanisms at work. 
 
Of course, industry studies also have their drawbacks. They may lead to narrow analyses 
and sometimes leave researchers reluctant to generalize their findings to other contexts 
where the institutions may be different. As a result, the broader take-aways often tend to 
be either qualitative insights —  for example that it is possible for entry to have a 
substantial effect on prices, or for  asymmetric information to matter significantly in 
market outcomes — or empirical methods that can be applied in multiple settings. In 
addition, critics sometimes argue that  the econometric models used in some studies, 
which often rely heavily on equilibrium assumptions, can lead to non-transparent 
analyses that obscure the link between the estimated parameters and the underlying 
variation in the data. We return to these points in the last section. 
 
Where Has The Action Been? A Brief Tour 
 
In this section, we describe a few active areas of empirical research in industrial 
organization. We start with the problem of estimating consumer demand, which is a key 
input for almost any study of market competition. We then discuss models of short-run 
price competition, both in traditional markets where firms post prices and in bidding 
markets where firms compete in auctions. Finally, we turn to the problem of longer-run 
competition, where entry, exit and investment decisions can shape market structure and 
the competitive landscape. 
 
In each case, we discuss some of the empirical methods that have been developed, and a 
few applications that usefully illustrate specific points. One point to emphasize is that 
although there is no recipe for empirical research in industrial organization, many papers 
share common themes. Modern research in the field often begins with a theory of market 
equilibrium, which can be more or less explicit depending on the application. Often   6 
researchers rely explicitly on assumptions about optimization or equilibrium to draw 
inferences about underlying parameters. In other cases, the theory is used to derive 
testable predictions about the data or to interpret estimates of causal effects. Careful 
attention is paid to the institutional context and market details. One broad lesson is that 
looking across industries these details can be very important. 
 
Estimating Demand in Imperfectly Competitive Markets 
 
Many studies of imperfect competition begin by describing consumer behavior, often by 
estimating a model of consumer demand for the products of the relevant industry. 
Consumer demand may be interesting in its own right --- to understand what consumers 
value and how they substitute between products as prices or product offerings change, to 
assess the welfare effects of mergers or new products, or to measure how information or 
advertising affect consumer decisions. Demand elasticities are also a critical input for 
identifying  the degree of market power that firms can exercise. Many of the focal 
advances in this area have come in the form of novel econometric models that in 
principle can be applied broadly across markets, as well as in non-market environments. 
 
The typical situation in most industries is that consumers face a choice of products that 
vary along different dimensions. Product differentiation bestows firms with a degree of 
market power. For instance, one factor weighing into Apple’s pricing of the iPhone is that 
some consumers just prefer the iPhone to comparable phones made by Palm or Nokia. 
Moreover, consumers who value the iPhone interface may be different from those who 
value the Blackberry’s ability to synch with corporate email servers. The problem 
becomes more subtle when we recognize that Apple sells several iPhone versions, and 
that consumers may be able to delay their purchase and wait for prices to fall. This means 
that Apple’s pricing incentives will depend not just on a single demand elasticity with 
respect to a single Apple price, but on a set of elasticities that describe how customers 
will shift their purchasing as Apple changes its pricing schedule. 
   7 
Assessing the demand for differentiated products, therefore, calls for an analysis that 
relates the prices of a set of competing products, and perhaps other strategic variables 
such as advertising, to the quantities sold of those products. This task poses an immediate 
challenge. Even a simple linear demand system for an industry with n products will have 
n
2 price coefficients, and estimating these coefficients will require distinct variation in 
each of the n  prices. The more products, the greater the identification challenge, 
particularly because many attractive sources of variation such as cost shocks may 
simultaneously affect all prices. Other idiosyncratic sources may affect just a few prices, 
leaving the effect of other prices not identified. 
 
Work on demand modeling, therefore, has centered on the trade-off between allowing 
flexible substitution patterns and the lack of variation in typical data that allows such 
substitution patterns to be flexibly identified. One strategy is to divide products into 
segments and estimate a model that restricts substitution patterns across segments but 
allows flexibility within segments. Hausman (1997) applies this approach in studying the 
demand for ready-to-eat cereals, dividing products into adult, family and kids’ cereals. 
Another strategy is to describe products in terms of a relatively small number of 
characteristics, and assume that consumers trade off price and other characteristics in a 
way that is uniform across products. Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes (1995) take this 
approach in modeling the demand for autos by describing cars in terms of their size, 
horsepower, and gas mileage, as well as a quality characteristic that is not captured by the 
three observable attributes. 
 
These techniques have been highly influential. They are commonly used in antitrust 
work, both in merger reviews to define the scope of the market and as an input to 
simulations, and in antitrust ligation to determine damages from excessively high prices. 
In recent years, these techniques have diffused into neighboring fields in economics, 
including trade, education, housing, health, and environmental economics. Because they 
allow researchers to map demand estimates to welfare, they also have been influential in 
debates over adjusting the consumer price index to account for new goods and 
substitution bias.   8 
 
In practice, these models of consumer demand commonly are estimated using either 
individual choice data or aggregate data on prices and market shares. Estimation requires 
variation that will identify the demand response to price and product changes. A standard 
concern is that because prices in a market tend to respond to demand shifts, there can be a 
simultaneity problem in trying to infer how purchasing decisions respond to price 
changes. This is the imperfect competition analogue to the textbook demand and supply 
simultaneity problem. Just as in the textbook setting, researchers frequently adopt an 
instrumental variables strategy.  
 
In part because it is hard to find independent movement of many product prices, some of 
the most popular identification strategies rely on restrictions across equations in the 
demand system. One such approach is to use a product’s price in other markets as an 
instrumental variable, under the theory that cross-market correlation in the price of a 
given product, conditional on observed demand characteristics, will be due to common 
cost factors rather than unobserved features of demand. An alternative is to instrument for 
prices using the non-price characteristics of competing products, which proxy for the 
degree of competition.  
 
Neither is a perfect solution, so the source of price variation and its power has to be 
evaluated in each application. Take the latter approach involving the  non-price 
characteristics of competing products. In the case of the iPhone, the relevant variation 
might arise from competing firms introducing touch screens, creating additional 
competition for Apple and leading it to reduce the iPhone price. While the story is not 
implausible, caution is clearly warranted. For instance, if competitors were themselves 
responding to the surprisingly high demand for iPhones, the exclusion restriction required 
for a valid instrument would be violated.  
 
Our own view is that many applications of these methods --- while they are often very 
careful in clarifying the statistical conditions under which their identification strategy is 
valid --- tend to be rather thin in explaining the precise source of identifying variation, in   9 
arguing why the required statistical condition is likely to hold, or in providing first stage 
regressions and other diagnostics. 
 
An important development in this regard is the increased availability of proprietary data 
on consumer behavior and the opportunity to engage in experiments sanctioned by firms. 
For example, a recent paper by Lewis and Reiley (2009) examines a large-scale 
experiment that randomized the exposure of consumers to internet advertising from a 
large retailer and tracked subsequent purchasing behavior. Although the focus is not on 
price elasticities, their study demonstrates the data-gathering capabilities of new 
technologies and the increased willingness of firms to cooperate in academic research. 
These trends are likely to create many opportunities for future research.  
 
One point to recognize, however, is that experimental measurement is not a panacea. In a 
typical demand setting, while experimental measurements of the consumer response to a 
specific change in prices or information are informative, they are only a starting point. 
Explicitly modeling consumer choices provides a way to link different behavioral 
responses and connect them to underlying parameters of interest,
2
 
 as well as a way to 
translate estimated behavioral responses into statements about consumer welfare. So 
while we imagine that better and richer data will allow researchers to obtain more precise 
and convincing estimates of consumer responses to prices, such improved estimates will 
complement rather than substitute the demand techniques described above. We return to 
these points in the final section.  
Market Power and Price Competition 
 
A long-standing and central problem in industrial organization is the extent to which 
market outcomes reflect the exercise of market power or some form of implicit or explicit 
                                                 
2 One example of this is Hendel and Nevo (2006), who point out that short-run estimates of demand 
elasticities can be misleading if consumers respond to sales by stockpiling non-perishables. Instead, they 
develop a model that relates estimated short-run elasticities to long-run elasticities, which are more relevant 
for the price effect of mergers. Another example is Cohen and Einav (2007), who show how data on 
insurance choices can be used to estimate risk preferences under the assumption that consumers maximize 
expected utility from wealth.    10 
collusion. Porter’s (1983) study of nineteenth century railroad cartels, Bresnahan’s (1987) 
study of the automobile industry and Nevo’s (2001) study of the breakfast cereal industry 
are classic analyses of market power. The approaches taken in these and related papers 
provide the basic toolkit for marrying demand and supply in an equilibrium analysis of 
imperfectly competitive markets.  
 
Underlying each of these studies is a model of market equilibrium. The most common 
model involves Bertrand-Nash price competition with differentiated products. In 
equilibrium, each firm sets its price to equal marginal cost plus a mark-up that depends 
on the semi-elasticity of the firm’s demand curve, taking the prices of competing 
products as given. These equilibrium conditions allow a researcher who has obtained 
estimates of consumer demand and firm costs to compute equilibrium prices, or test 
hypotheses about non-cooperative pricing behavior, perhaps against alternative 
behavioral assumptions such as collusive pricing. 
  
In a typical study, a researcher might start with prices and quantities from a cross-section 
or panel of markets. Often the first step is to estimate market demand, for instance using 
one of the strategies described in the previous section. On the supply side, researchers 
sometimes have access to accounting data on costs, although as emphasized by 
Bresnahan (1989), accounting practices generally are not geared toward reporting the 
economic notion of marginal cost that the theory implies should be  relevant. An 
alternative is to infer costs from observed prices by relying on an assumption of profit 
maximization (Rosse, 1970). To do this, the researcher computes the optimal markup 
using estimated demand elasticities, and subtracts it from the observed price to obtain an 
estimate of marginal cost. This approach relies on the strong assumption that firms are 
setting profit-maximizing prices, but it is often employed due to its elegance and the fact 
that it does not require direct cost data. Our view is that at times it can be a bit too 
seductive, in the sense that researchers sometimes shun available cost data on the grounds 
that it is imperfect even when it could be quite informative or at least complementary. A 
few studies, including Nevo (2001) and Hortacsu and Puller (2008), combine direct and   11 
indirect cost measurement to cross-check their analyses and test the hypothesis of 
equilibrium pricing.  
 
The basic framework of imperfect competition that we have just described provides a 
starting point for a wide variety of analyses. Many of the early industry studies focused 
on distinguishing the unilateral exercise of market power from collusive alternatives, or 
measuring the price and welfare impacts of mergers, taxes, or new goods. More recent 
work has incorporated and studied the effects of search costs, price discrimination, retail 
sales and consumer stockpiling, adverse selection effects, and the use of non-price 
strategies to attract customers. As we now illustrate, this work can be highly diverse, 
linked by the conceptual framework of imperfect competition but not necessarily 
constrained to “traditional” product markets. 
 
One example is a recent paper by Ellison and Ellison (2009), which analyzes how 
internet price comparison engines affect competition among a set of internet retailers. 
They use carefully documented price variation to show that the price ranking provided by 
the search engine leads to dramatic consumer price sensitivity. This sensitivity gives 
firms an incentive to engage in “obfuscation” to manipulate consumer search and in this 
way to relax what would otherwise be cut-throat price competition. A second example is 
the work by Gentzkow and Shapiro (2009), who construct a measure of newspaper 
“slant”, and estimate consumer demand for it using variation in the distribution areas of 
local newspapers. They then use the estimated demand as an input in a model of optimal 
choice of “slant” by newspaper owners. A final example comes from our own work on 
consumer credit markets (Einav, Jenkins and Levin, 2008). In that work, we start by 
using discrete shifts in pricing to estimate credit demand, in this case for subprime auto 
loans. We then incorporate the demand estimates into a model of loan pricing in order to 
study screening and credit terms as set by a lender with market power. 
 
A key point to emphasize about these applications is that while the use of detailed data 
and relatively transparent identification are important, the results themselves are most 
interesting when viewed through the lens of a particular theoretical model. As with any   12 
empirical study, the exact results apply to a particular setting at a particular time, and we 
have already argued that across the broader economy there is a great deal of 
heterogeneity in the way markets and industries operate. Thus, what makes the analyses 
meaningful beyond a narrow context is that they illuminate theoretical mechanisms — 
manipulation of consumer search, catering to ideological preferences, or pricing under 
asymmetric information — that will also operate in other markets at other times. 
 
While we have focused on academic studies, one notable effect of the methods described 
above has been to shift the standards for empirical evidence in merger reviews and 
antitrust litigation. Thirty years ago, it was common for antitrust arguments to rest on 
simple summary measures of industry structure such as concentration ratios  and 
Herfindahl-Hirschman indices. Nowadays, the Department of Justice and the Federal 
Trade Commission, which are tasked with reviewing proposed mergers, commonly 
undertake sophisticated econometric studies to define industry boundaries and assess the 
likelihood of price increases or collusive behavior following a merger. These exercises 
often draw on academic research, and in turn have motivated the development of new 
empirical models. 
 
Competition in Auction Markets 
 
The section above described models of imperfect competition that apply most directly to 
traditional consumer markets where firms post prices. Many intermediate goods markets 
are bidding markets. For example, firms and governments often solicit bids to supply 
goods or services, or use auctions to sell resources in limited supply. Though not always 
appreciated, the connection between bidding markets and traditional price competition is 
very close. In recent years, economists have developed a set of empirical methods for 
analyzing auction markets  that in many ways parallel the imperfect competition 
framework discussed above (Athey and Haile, 2006; Hendricks and Porter, 2007).  
 
To see the connection, observe that in an auction context, firms bidding to supply a 
product or service set prices in a way that trades off a higher probability of winning   13 
against a higher margin if they do win, just as a firm setting the price of its product in a 
consumer market trades off the prospect of higher sales against having a higher margin. 
In an important contribution, Guerre, Perrigne and Vuong (2000) drew on this connection 
to suggest how a researcher might use bidding data to infer the underlying values or costs 
of bidders. Roughly, the idea is to use data from a sequence of auctions to estimate the 
probability, from an individual bidder’s perspective, that a given bid will win. This is 
sufficient to calculate the optimal markup, and hence to estimate the values underlying 




Athey, Levin and Seira (2008) use this approach to study whether competition is affected 
by whether bidders are asked to submit sealed bids or instead compete in an open 
ascending auction. They analyze data from the U.S. Forest Service, which in the 1980s 
used both sealed bid and open auctions to sell timber, in certain cases randomizing how 
sales would be run. Regressions exploiting this variation reveal that sealed bid auctions 
tended to attract more bidders and sometimes generated higher prices. Athey, Levin and 
Seira show that a model of equilibrium bidding that incorporates differences in the size 
and technologies of potential competitors can match the empirical patterns. They use the 
model to test the hypothesis that certain auctions may have been prone  to bidder 
collusion. 
 
In addition to providing a structured environment to analyze traditional questions about 
imperfect competition, auctions also provide an empirical laboratory for studying 
strategic behavior in the presence of asymmetric information. A pioneering example is 
Hendricks and Porter’s (1988) study of government auctions for offshore oil drilling 
rights. In these auctions, firms try to gauge the potential oil reserves by doing seismic 
                                                 
3 Specifically, if bidder j has cost cj of supplying a good and believes the lowest competing bid will follow 
a distribution G (with density g), its optimal bid bj satisfies bj = cj + [1-G(bj)]/g(bj). This suggests an 
empirical strategy in which data from a sequence of auctions is used to estimate a statistical model of bids. 
The estimate then proxies for G (and g), permitting the researcher to associate each observed bid with an 
underlying cost of supplying that makes the bid profit-maximizing. The connection to product pricing is 
that a profit-maximizing firm sets its price pj so that pj= cj+ Q(pj)/Q'(pj), where cj is marginal cost and Q is 
the firm’s residual demand taking as given the prices of the other firms. In the product market case, the 
estimated demand system allows the researcher to proxy for Q, and hence infer costs from prices. 
   14 
studies. Hendricks and Porter compare auctions for newly opened territory with sales of 
territory that adjoins developed areas. In the former, no bidder has a particular advantage. 
In the latter, the owner of an adjacent lease may have extra information. The auction 
outcomes differ dramatically in these two cases, with adjacent lease-holders profiting in a 
way that corresponds closely to predictions from the theory of asymmetric information. 
This study and subsequent research by Hendricks, Pinkse and Porter (2003) provides 
some of the sharpest empirical support for equilibrium models of asymmetric 
information. 
 
A recent line of research, on the advertising auctions conducted by Google and other 
internet platforms illustrates the power of combining auction methods with large-scale 
datasets and field experiments. For instance, Varian (2009) uses data from Google to 
estimate the division of surplus in their sponsored search auctions by inferring values 
under an assumption of optimal bidding. In related work, Ostrovsky and Schwarz (2009) 
describe the design of a reserve price mechanism for Yahoo!’s sponsored search auctions. 
They use a calibrated model of equilibrium bidding to derive optimal reserve prices. They 
then implement reserve prices suggested by the model in a large-scale field experiment 
and track the resulting increase in platform revenue.  
 
These papers at the intersection of industrial organization and auction theory highlight the 
value of the interplay between theory and research design. For example, in the Athey, 
Levin and Seira paper, the authors use theory to translate the observed data (bids) into 
structural parameters (estimates of bidder values) that allow out-of-sample predictions. 
The variation in the data, however, is what allows a sharp test of the model. In the 
Ostrovsky and Schwarz paper, insights from optimal auction theory guided the modeling 
and calibration, and the experimental design provides confirmation of its usefulness. 
Economic theory has an important role to play in empirical work, facilitating predictions 
“before the fact” or “outside the data”.  
 
Academic research on auction markets has also played a key role in regulatory policy, for 
example in the case of re-structured wholesale electricity markets. These markets   15 
frequently involve electricity generation facilities bidding to supply power, and analyses 
along the lines described above have been influential in highlighting potential problems 
associated with the exercise of market power, as well as the relationship between daily 
spot markets and long-term forward contracts between electricity generators and 
distributors. For example, Borenstein, Bushnell and Wolak (2002) analyze data from the 
California wholesale electricity market and argue that the dramatic price spike during the 
summer of 2000 was due in large part to the exercise of market power, rather than an 
increase in production costs. 
 
Determinants of Market Structure 
 
A classic question dating back at least to Bain’s work in the 1950s is how the set of firms 
in an industry and their relative capabilities affects competition, innovation, and other 
market outcomes. This question leads to asking what determines, over time, the set of 
firms present in an industry. In particular, what barriers to entry serve to keep markets 
more or less imperfectly competitive? Questions about market structure have been the 
focus of sustained research from a number of different directions. 
 
One way to tackle the question of how market structure affects competition is by focusing 
on specific episodes of entry or exit from a market. For example, Goolsbee and Syverson 
(2008) study how prices are affected by Southwest Airlines entry into new routes. They 
find that prices fall sharply and the decline begins in advance of the actual date of entry. 
Prices begin to fall once Southwest starts operating at both endpoints of a route, making 
entry into the route probable. In another example that focuses on strategic theories of 
entry deterrence, Ellison and Ellison (2007) look at the behavior of pharmaceutical firms 
just prior to patent expiration. They use variation in market size to identify settings where 
incumbent firms might profitably engage in entry deterrence strategies, and present 
evidence that these strategies are being used.  
 
An alternative approach, pioneered by Bresnahan and Reiss (1991), also relies on 
variation in market size but combines this variation with an assumption that markets are   16 
in a state of long-run equilibrium. The basic idea, which also appears in Sutton (1991), is 
to think of variable profits as scaling with the size of the market.
4
  
 In the specific markets 
considered by Bresnahan and Reiss, namely service providers such as dentists, 
pharmacists and plumbers in small isolated towns, the idea can be stated simply. If it 
takes 800 residents to support a single dentist and the entry of a second dentist does not 
result in lowered margins or affect entry costs, a town of 1,600 residents should support 
two dentists. However, if the presence of a second dentist intensifies competition, it will 
take more than 1,600 residents.  In this way, variation in market size can be used to draw 
inferences about the rate at which competition causes prices to fall toward unit cost.  
Bresnahan and Reiss (1991) estimate the size threshold required to support different 
numbers of firms in a given industry. Their surprising finding is that compared to the 
population required to support a single firm, the incremental population required to 
support a second firm is much larger, sometimes even double, but the incremental 
population required to support a third and a fourth firm is about the same as for the 
second. Interpreted through the lens of their theory, competition appears to kick in 
relatively quickly and lead to lower margins with just a few firms, but then does not ramp 
up with additional entrants. 
 
Bresnahan  and Reiss’ (1991) work illustrates how even relatively sparse data, used 
creatively in conjunction with economic theory and clean research design, can be applied 
to tackle an important question --- in their case, how competition varies with the number 
of  firms in a market. This work has generated a substantial literature, although in a 
direction that has focused more heavily on the econometric methods than on the original 
questions. One might have expected researchers to have followed up by looking for other 
sorts of identifying variation (say in fixed costs or entry restrictions) or by gathering data 
on prices and costs (which is largely absent in the original work). Instead, attention has 
tended to focus on developing more general econometric methods that allow for firm 
                                                 
4 If variable profits scale with the size of the market, then π(n)=S⋅q(pn)⋅(pn-c) where pn is the price charged 
if there are n competitors, c is the unit cost of production, q(p) is the share of potential customers who 
purchase, and S is the market size. If there is a fixed cost F to being in the market, long-run equilibrium 
should exhibit the property that π(n)>F>π(n+1).  The innovation of using long-run equilibrium conditions 
as a basis for estimation also appears in Berry (1992).   17 
heterogeneity or relax parametric restrictions, often applying the same Bresnahan and 
Reiss identifying assumptions in situations where they are less compelling. These 
extensions have lead to a rich literature on identification and estimation methods (Berry 
and Tamer, 2006), but one can argue that they haven’t necessarily taken us much closer 




Many questions about market structure are most naturally viewed in a dynamic context. 
For example, one may be interested in whether new industries follow a common “life 
cycle” of entry and consolidation, or how firm and industry growth patterns vary with 
market characteristics, or whether mergers are likely to be followed quickly by  new 
entry, or how industries adapt to booms and recessions. A dynamic perspective can also 
temper conventional intuition on standard problems. For example, higher market 
concentration can reduce static welfare due to less competition and higher prices, but the 
prospect of gaining market power can provide strong incentives for innovation with 
consequent welfare benefits.  
 
The literature that addresses these types of questions can be separated roughly into two 
strands. One strand has looked across industries in search of robust patterns of 
survivorship, turnover and firm growth. One important take-away documented in this 
literature is that even within relatively narrow industries, there is a great deal of 
heterogeneity across establishments. This observation has proven very influential. It has 
played an important role in the development of theoretical models of industry dynamics 
(e.g. Hopenhayn, 1992), and these models in turn have helped to touch off a vast amount 
of recent work in international trade on the role of firm heterogeneity (Melitz, 2003). In 
addition, the recognition that entry and exit patterns are systematically related to firm 
characteristics has been incorporated in the literature on industrial productivity, following 
the influential work of Olley and Pakes (1996).  
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A second strand of work on industry dynamics has focused on models of dynamic 
equilibrium in individual industries, often adopting the framework proposed by Ericson 
and Pakes (1995). For example, Benkard (2004) applies such a model to the commercial 
aircraft industry, where he documents dramatic cost effects due to learning-by-doing. 
Benkard (2004) calibrates a dynamic oligopoly model using industry data and uses the 
quantitative model to illustrate the (dynamic) pricing incentives.  One insight is that 
equilibrium can involve prices below marginal cost as a way to speed up production and 
reduce future costs. In addition, the prospect of market power is what provides an 
incentive to get down the learning curve. This effect gets passed on to consumers in the 
form of lower prices, both early in the product life cycle (to speed up learning) and later 
on (due to reduced costs).  More recent work in this area has suggested empirical 
strategies that allow estimation of sunk costs, learning, or adjustment frictions, using 
panel data on firms or local markets (Aguirregabiria and Mira, 2007; Bajari, Benkard and 
Levin, 2007; Pakes, Ostrovsky and Berry, 2007). 
 
One difficulty in estimating and working with these types of dynamic industry models is 
that the information available in the data sometimes can pale in comparison to the 
ambitious questions that are being asked, forcing the researcher to fill in the gaps with 
strong modeling assumptions. Our own view is that such work is best viewed as a 
quantitative theory exercise. Its primary role is to shed light on certain aspects of 
dynamic competition, in the context of a particular model with reasonably chosen 
parameter values. Is this a problem? We don’t think so. While results from such exercises 
should be taken with the appropriate caution, it seems hard to imagine a clean research 
design that, say, would nail the long-run effect on innovation attributable to a change in 
the patent system or a new research and development subsidy. When a single data point is 
the entire time series of an industry, opportunities to utilize quasi-experimental variation 
are rare, but this does not mean economists should give up on attempts to investigate 
important questions about, say, the tradeoff between market power and innovation 
incentives.  
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Stepping back and looking forward 
 
Thirty years ago, empirical work in industrial organization was perhaps broadly similar to 
other applied fields.  At about the same time that industrial organization economists were 
running cross-industry regressions and coming to terms with the problems of 
endogeneity, omitted variables, and reverse causality, labor economists, for example, 
were running wage regressions that faced a similar set of issues. Since then, however, 
empirical work in industrial organization has evolved dramatically, and in a distinctive 
direction: toward analyses of individual industries where one can obtain cleaner 
measurement and identification, and toward studies that frame their empirical analysis in 
terms of an economic theory of the relevant industry or a set of competing theories. 
 
In an essay that appears in this issue of JEP, Angrist and Pischke (2010) describe a 
parallel development in applied microeconomics toward analyses that uses randomized 
experiments or “quasi-experiments” to identify causal effects. In the course of doing this, 
they launch what strikes us as a somewhat misguided attack on empirical research in 
industrial organization. In part to clear up potential confusion, and in part because we 
have our own views about fruitful directions for research in industrial organization, it 
seems useful to discuss how their arguments relate to the type of work we have discussed 
above. 
 
One issue relates to what constitutes acceptable identifying variation in a given study. 
Here, there is really no disagreement about the ideal. Every researcher would like to first 
define an object of interest and then design the perfect experiment to measure it. But in 
the absence of this ideal, researchers generally face trade-offs. A common trade-off is 
between how clean a measurement one obtains versus how well the measured object 
proxies for the original object of interest. 
 
Suppose a researcher is interested in consumer demand for cereal, and ideally would like 
to know the n-by-n matrix of cross-price elasticities. As we described above, a common 
approach in industrial organization has been to control carefully for possible shifts in   20 
demand, and then rely on an assumption that the residual correlation in prices across 
cities is due to changes in costs (e.g. Nevo, 2001). An alternative might be to look for 
specific episodes where particular prices were shifted for explicable but plausibly 
exogenous reasons, say a week when the Froot Loops pricing algorithm malfunctioned 
and there was an unintended sale, and use these episodes to estimate demand elasticities 
with respect to the price of Froot Loops. The researcher might then extrapolate by 
assuming that a change in the price of Frosted Flakes, or perhaps any cereal, would have 
analogous effects. 
 
In the context of the example, neither approach is the ideal. The former relies on a 
potentially questionable identification assumption, but frames the empirical exercise 
directly in terms of the object of interest. The latter may provide a more compelling 
measurement of a few entries in the matrix, but getting to the object of interest involves a 
questionable extrapolation. One problem with attempts such as Angrist and Pischke’s to 
evaluate entire research approaches in the abstract is that they paint too simple a picture. 
The resolution to the type of trade-off described above almost certainly depends on the 
research question that is being asked, the data that is available to answer it, and the 
degree to which economic theory provides a compelling rationale for making 
assumptions about relationships in the data. Our own view about industrial organization 
is that there is room for a variety of approaches, even for tackling the same question. 
Indeed, because any research can only come so close to the requisite answer, careful 
work from different angles is often complementary.   
 
A second issue about how industrial organization has evolved relates to the use of 
economic theory in empirical research. It seems safe to assume that professional 
economists, or at least the vast majority of them, believe that economic theory provides a 
powerful lens for thinking about the world. So what is striking about Angrist and 
Pischke’s picture of empirical research is that it seems to involve very little role for 
economic theory in thinking about or analyzing data. Instead, and in contrast to many of 
the studies described in this essay, they favor measurement strategies that are 
uncontaminated by restrictions that arise from an economic model. One of their   21 
justifications is transparency; they seem to conflate the use of economic theory with 
complex modeling that obscures the data. This strikes us as a false equivalence, however, 
in the sense that one can have a perfectly clear exposition of a model derived from 
economic theory and a perfectly obscure exposition of a linear regression.  
 
From our perspective, it seems more natural to start with a research question and then ask 
to what extent economic theory helps to shed light on the problem. For instance, Angrist 
and Pischke focus on the effect of class size on student learning outcomes. Standard 
economic theory does not have a great deal to say about student behavior in third-grade 
classrooms. So while one could start with an equilibrium model of student learning and 
use it to structure empirical work, there is good reason to adopt a more statistical 
approach, observing that there are thousands of third-grade classrooms engaged in 
roughly parallel activities and many opportunities to find attractive variation in class size 
to assess its effect on learning.  
 
For industrial organization research, however, this frequently is not the right paradigm. 
First, industrial organization is largely about the operation of firms and markets, where 
economic theory has a lot to say and when appropriately used generally serves to clarify 
rather than complicate one’s understanding of a market. Second, the interesting question 
in many studies is not just a causal effect per se, but understanding the mechanisms at 
work. As we have emphasized throughout this essay, markets differ greatly, and 
importing particular numbers (about demand elasticities, production costs, or policy 
effects) across markets often does not seem compelling. Instead, if one hopes to 
generalize, it is often more appealing to view empirical research as building up support 
for principles of strategic interaction or market functioning that are broadly applicable 
across industries. 
 
The particular example chosen by Angrist and Pischke to critique empirical work in 
industrial organization --- the evaluation of mergers --- illustrates some of these points. 
As we discussed above, it is common in assessing a proposed merger to frame the 
problem in terms of a theoretical model of industry competition. Researchers have spent   22 
considerable time developing econometric tools to quantify the potential effects in the 
context of such models. Angrist and Pischke criticize this work and dismiss it as 
needlessly indirect. Instead they ask why there hasn’t been more retrospective analysis of 
past mergers. At one level, their point is a good one --- why not more retrospective 
analysis of past mergers? At another level, it entirely misses the point. Do they seriously 
think that if the Department of Justice had to review a merger of Microsoft and Yahoo! it 
should rely on the price effect of past airline or office supply company mergers, or better 
yet the subset that resulted from chance meetings of CEOs or lunar eclipses? It seems far 
more useful to lay out a clear conceptual framework to think through the potential effects, 
adding the best available evidence in a sensible way.   
 
The bottom line, however, is that the use of economic theory and the search for 
compelling sources of identifying variation are not enemies. Indeed, we hope to have 
conveyed that the applied work we often find most exciting relies on careful 
measurement based on data with good underlying variation, but then continues by 
framing the empirical exercise in terms of a coherent economic model. The model can 
then provide a way to think about the operation of the industry and potentially to draw 
conclusions about policy or general principles.  
 
To the extent that we have a concern about the current state of industrial organization 
research, it is that there is not sufficient emphasis on this kind of applications, relative to, 
say, expanding the set of econometric methods. Of course, better methods are valuable, 
provided they eventually get used in compelling ways and do not become an end in 
themselves. If we return again to the demand estimation literature, it is possible that one 
reason researchers have been willing to tolerate less than ideal price variation is that in 
some cases the main contribution is not the estimated price elasticities per se but the 
econometric method, which can be applied more broadly. While this is not terribly 
objectionable, it is important that the field at large strikes a balance between building 
tools and using them convincingly. Whether the field has tipped too far is debatable, but 
the fact that one might engage in a serious debate suggests some grounds for concern. 
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From a historical perspective, one way to understand the current balance relates to data 
limitations. Some of the most influential methodological advances in industrial 
organization were, in fact, responses to problems of limited data. The entry model of 
Bresnahan and Reiss (1991) gets around missing data on prices and quantities. The 
demand estimation method introduced by Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (1995) has been 
so influential in part because it requires only market-level rather than individual-level 
data. We have tried to stress throughout this essay that the situation is changing rapidly. 
Virtually every major firm now collects vast amounts of data on their customers, their 
employees, and other aspects of their business. It is increasingly easy to collect data on 
prices and quantities, entry and exit, firm locations, and accounting information. The 
advent of vastly richer data may substitute for methods, and encourage industrial 
organization economists to shift some of the focus toward applying existing methods 
rather than developing new ones.  
 
There is a related concern, and to be fair, one that applies equally to the empirical 
strategies favored by Angrist and Pischke, that focusing on the elegance of the solution 
can lead one to gravitate toward less important questions. For example, suppose we were 
to think about the research avenues one could pursue related to the internet platform 
eBay. If we started with the view that it was a potential laboratory for applying elegant 
empirical auction methods, it would be natural to focus on narrower and narrower 
submarkets in order to isolate specific features of the auction format. While this is useful, 
it might take one away from broader issues, such as why eBay as an institution has been 
so successful or how they compete with Amazon and other platforms for buyers and 
sellers. Indeed, economics researchers of all varieties should resist the temptation of 
grabbing a hammer and letting it pull them toward a limited set of nails.  
 
A final and important issue for the future of industrial organization relates to the shift 
from cross-industry analysis to industry studies. In his post-mortem on the cross-industry 
literature in industrial organization, Schmalensee (1989) pointed out that it had not taught 
us much about how markets actually work. After 20 years of industry studies, we know a 
lot about how specific industries work, but this knowledge is extremely disaggregated.   24 
We have detailed analysis on automobiles, airlines, electricity, and cement and concrete 
plants (which are not the same!). But this knowledge does not easily accumulate across 
industries. As a result, industrial organization has ceded many of the interesting and 
important questions about the overall organization of production in the economy to other 
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